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Constructive Memory for Bizarre and Sensible Sentences
Paula T. Hertel and Henry C. Ellis
Universi ty of New Mexico

S ensible, in terre lated sentences were presented with or without bizarre se
- n
tences that could be transformed to fit the context of the sensible sentences.
Two experiments examined subjec-ts' ability to recognize or rec all both types
of sentences, either immediately -or after 2 weeks. Bizarre sentences were
frequently recognized at immediate testing; they were generally unavailable
at del aye d recognition and were never recalled verbatim. In addition, results
indicated that transfor mations of bizarre sentences were stored in memory
but were not well inc orp orated within the structure for the sensible mater i al.
These findings are consistent with a constructive app ro ach to memory.
Finally, the results suggest that p roc essin g bizarre information can lead to
more accurate recognition an d recall o f th e s ensi bl e con text.

The constructive approach to memory has
emphasized that memory for an event can
change qualitatively over the course of time.
The approach has its roots in Bartlett's
(1932) memory investigations in which sub
jects read folktales from unfamiliar cultures
and reproduced them repeatedly over vary
ing intervals of time (cf. Cofer, 1976) .
Bartlett drew two major conclusions con
cerning the processess affecting the observed
memory changes : (a) Recall was recon
structed from schemata or representations
of meaningful information that had been ab
stracted during the processing of the folk
tales and (b) subjects processed unusual
portions of the folktales in an "effort after
meaning," in an attempt to make the ma
terial more understandable and, therefore,
easier to integrate into the overall meaning
structure.
This research was supported by National Insti
tute of Mental Health Grant MH-15142 to the
second author.
We wish to thank Elizabeth Loftus and Charles
Cofer for their thoughtful comments on an earlier
draft and John Schnizlein for helpful advice and
the formulation of the conversion algorithm for
A', based on Pollack and Norman (1964).
Requests for reprints should be sent to Henry C.
Ellis, Department of Psychology, University of
New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131.
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Evidence for Bartlett's first conclusion, re
construction from abstract representations,
has been supplied by several closely related
lines of research. The nature of what is
remembered about meaningful material can
be located on a continuum from verbatim to
thematic information. For example, both
recognition and recall errors in memory for
sentence surface structure occur more fre
quently than meaning errors (Jarvella, 1971 ;
Sachs, 1967) . In addition, the meaning of
individual sentences is forgotten more rap
idly than paragraph gist or ideas expressed
by more than one sentence (Bransford &
Franks, 1972 ; Dooling, Christiaansen, &
Keenan, Note 1) . However, the tendency
to rely on abstract information rather than
verbatim information is partly determined
by the type of material to be learned (Brans
ford & Franks, 1972) and by task demands
(Graesser & Mandler, 1975) .
Additional evidence that memory is recon
structed from holistic representations has
emanated from experiments in inferential
reasoning and context manipulations. The
major thrust of these experiments is that
extra experimental knowledge (Bransford,
Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Sulin & Dooling,
1974) or related experimental materials
(Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Loftus, 1975;
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Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) contribute to
changes in memorial performance.
The great majority of research in this
area has emphasized the constructive pro
cessing of sensible material. In contrast,
little support has been found for Bartlett's
( 1932) conclusion that bizarre information
is omitted or transformed to make it more
comprehensible. Although Bartlett did find
that subjects frequently omitted portions
that were difficult to understand, he did not
report data concerning immediate memory
for the bizarre portions. In addition, the use
of a reproductive memory task may have
biased subjects to write well-integrated, sen
sible stories, explaining or omitting unusual
elements that may have been remembered.
Finally, repeated attempts to recall involve
the obvious problem of memory for the re
sults of earlier efforts.
The following experiments were designed
to test Bartlett's (1932) conclusions con
cerning memory for the bizarre. Bizarre sen
tences were constructed by violating rules
of language usage, specifically by having in
animate objects perform actions of which
they are incapable ; an example is "The hot
dogs prepared the woman." The bizarre sen
tences were presented along with sensible
sentences that provided a context for possible
transformations of the bizarre. For example,
hearing that it was dinner time, the woman
was dutiful, hot dogs were steaming, and
children were hungry establishes a context
for transforming the bizarre information into
the idea that the woman prepared the hot
dogs. A constructive approach to memory
predicts that bizarre information should be,
for the most part, forgotten at delayed testing
due to the difficulty of constructing accurate
semantic representations or to the difficulty
of combining verbatim representations of the
bizarre and the sensible material into a mean
ingful whole. In addition, strong evidence for
integrated memory would be provided by the
transformation of the bizarre elements into
sensible information more consonant with
the interrelated context. The latter possi
bility is the phenomenon referred to by
Bartlett as ·effort after meaning. Finally, we
expected to find that the sensible context was
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stored in an integrated fashion. In summary,
these experiments focus on two principal
issues : (a) the temporal course of memory
for bizarre information and (b) the effect
of the bizarre information on memory for the
sensible context.
Experiment 1
The first experiment employed a modifica
tion of Bransford and Frank's ( 1972) para
digm for demonstrating integrated memory.
This paradigm was chosen because it in
volves the presentation of single sentences.
Presenting single sentences should decrease
the bias against responding to strange ele
ments, which may exist with prose material.
In addition, the single sentences are solely
recombinations of simple ideas contained in
one complex idea. Bransford and Franks
have shown that subjects construct the com
plex idea (which is never presented during
acquisition) as the most ·efficient means of
encoding the experimental material. There
fore, in this experiment, the sensible material,
presented as a list of such sentences, should
be stored in a unified fashion and should
provide an appropriate context for trans
forming the bizzare.
The procedure consisted of an acquisi
tion phase, during which subjects wrote
each sentence after hearing it, and a recog
nition phase, during which subjects at
tempted to detect previously presented sen
tences out of a list of old sentences combined
with several types of distractors, including
transformations of the bizarre. The acqui
sition list either included the bizarre sen
tences (bizarre condition) or did not (con
trol condition) , and recognition testing oc
curred either immediately or after a 2-wk.
delay.
Recognition of bizarre sentences was ex
pected to be excellent at immediate testing,
demonstrating a lack of bias against process
ing the unusual. Second, given a high level
of immediate recognition, bizarre informa
tion was expected to be unavailable at de
layed testing. In addition, bizarre-acquisition
subjects were predicted to be poorer than
control-acquisition subjects at rejecting
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transformations of the bizarre, compared to
nontransformational distractors.
Method
Subjects. Forty-eight volunteers from introduc
tory psychology classes at the University of New
Mexico served as subjects ( 12 in each condition) and
received class credit. Groups of 4--8 subjects were
randomly assigned to acquisition conditions, and sub
jects within groups were randomly assigned to
test conditions.
Materials. Two idea sets, or complex propo
sitions, were invented and are presented in Table
1. Each idea set may be broken into six simple
ideas, and sentences may be constructed that con
tain from one to four of the simple ideas within
each idea set.
For both acquisitions lists, 16 of these sen
tences were constructed so as not to include the
main idea of the idea set ("The woman prepared
hot dogs" and "The grandfather comforted the
girl"). Constraints of equal frequency of idea set
and sentence length (from one to four simple
ideas) were observed. Each simple idea occurred
an equal number of times and was just as likely
to occur in a short sentence as in a long one. Ex
amples of two-idea, sensible acquisition sentences
are also presented in Table 1. The two acquisition
lists differed only with respect to the bizarre sen
tences in Table 1. The bizarre list contained these
sentences in Positions 5 and 12, whereas the con
trol list contained two extra one-idea sentences in
the corresponding positions. The remaining list
positions were randomly determined, with the re
striction that sentences from the same idea set did

not occur consecutively. A total of 18 sentences
occurred on each list.
The recognition list contained the two bizarre
sentences, eight old sensible sentences, and eight
sentences from each of four distractor types. In all
cases, the eight sentences were comprised of two
sentences within each sentence length ( 1-4), one
of the two from each idea set (except for noncase
distractors, in which case sentences contained ideas
from both idea sets).
The two-idea sentences for each distractor type
are presented in Table 1. New distractors were
constructed just like the sensible-acquisition sen
tences; however, they were not presented until
recognition testing. (Similarly constructed sen
tences were used by Bransford and Franks, 1972,
to demonstrate loss of memory for exact wording.)
Transformed sentences all included the main idea
of the idea set, which was never presented during
acquisition. Inference sentences all included an
alternate way of stating the main idea; the verbs
cooked and helPed were consistently used in place
of prepared and comforted. These sentences served
as controls for the possibility. that transformed
sentences might be responded to solely on the
basis that they contain logical inferences. Finally,
noncase sentences contained words or ideas from
both idea sets and were included as controls for
semantic accuracy.
Selection of the 42 sentences was randomized
for each of four recognition list orders ; idea sets
alternated. The assignment of list order was coun
terbalanced within experimental conditions.
Procedure..
Instructions and materials for the
acquisition phase were presented on a cassette re
corder. Subjects were told that they would hear
a list of sentences and that their task was to

Table 1
Acquisition and Recognition Materials for Experiment 1
Idea set
Item

At dinnertime the dutiful woman prepared
The protective grandfather rushed outside
to comfort the little girl who fell off her
steaming hot dogs for the hungry children.
bike and was crying.

Sensible
Bizarre

At dinnertime the children were hungry.
The hot dogs prepared the woman.

New

The steaming hot dogs were for the children.

Transformed

At dinnertime the woman prepared hot dogs.

Inference
Noncase

The woman cooked hot dogs for the children
The dutiful woman rushed outside.

Acquisition sentences
The little girl was crying.
The bike comforted the grandfather.

Recognition distractors
The grandfather was protective and the
girl fell off her bike.
The grandfather comforted the girl who fell
off her bike.
The protective grandfather helped the girl.
The girl was little and the children were
hungry.

Note. Examples of sensible acquisition sentences and distractors are all two ideas in length, although lengths
of one to four were employed in the experiment.
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listen to each sentence, name the color of a card
held by the experimenter, write the sentence, and
fold the paper down to cover the sentence. Two
practice trials were given. Sentence presentation
rate was controlled by the experimenter to allow
an interval long enough for all subjects to write
the sentences ; the interval varied from approxi
mately 15 to 30 sec. Following the acquisition
phase, half of the subjects in each group were ran
domly selected to return in 2 wk. and were not
told what to expect on return.
The recognition phase was administered to
groups of two to four subjects. Response sheets
were numbered from 1 to 42, with the words YES NO
next to each number. Subjects were instructed to
judge whether each recognition sentence had been
presented previously in the experiment by circling
the appropriate word. The list was presented on
tape, with a 5-sec pause between sentences.

Results and Discussion

Preliminary analyses found no reliable in
teractions with idea set; therefore, the data
were collapsed across this variable. Table 2
presents the hit rates or false alarm rates for
each type of recognition sentence. For analy
ses concerning memory for bizarre sen
tences, the hit rates for these sentences were
compared to those for old sensible sentences.
Second, to analyze detection differences
among distractor types, false alarm rates and
the hit rates for old sentences were converted
into A' statistics, which are comparable to
percentage correct in a two-alternative;
forced-choice task (Green & Swets, 1974,
Appendix III, 3.3) . Table 3 presents A' cell
means for each distractor type. A value of
.5 represents the inability to detect differ
ences between the distractors and the old
sensible sentences.
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The relevant
Memory for the bizarre.
data in Table 2 are the proportion of yes re
sponses to bizarre and old sentences that
were made by subjects in the bizarre-im
mediate and bizarre-delay conditions. Clearly,
the number of positive responses to old sensi
ble sentences remained at a substantial level
over the delay interval, whereas those to
bizarre sentences decreased dramatically,
F(1, 44) = 23.70, MS.= 4.57, p < .001.
Although fewer bizarre sentences were pre
sented on the acquisition list, subjects rec
ognized them as well as old sentences when
they were tested immediately, F (1, 11 ) =
.90, MS. = 9.24.
The
Transformations of the bizarre.
means in Table 3 indicate that rejection of
transformed sentences decreased over time
for both acquisition conditions, F (1, 44) =
19.00, MSe = .012, p < .001. In addition,
control conditions were reliably better than
bizarre conditions in rejecting the trans
formed distractors, F(l, 44) = 4.85, MS.=
.012, p < .033. More importantly, at delayed
testing the difference between rejection of
transformed and inference distractors was
greater for the bizarre condition than for
the control condition, F(l, 44) = 8.47, MS.
= .016, p < .006. Therefore, at delayed
testing, only the responses of subjects hear
ing bizarre input indicated a memory bias for
sensible restatements of the bizarre (trans
formed distractors) , which was greater than
any tendency to respond to statements im
plied by the sensible input sentences (in
ference distractors) .
Results that were somewhat unexpected

Table 2
Proportion of Yes Responses for Each Type of Recognition Sentence
Condition

Note. n

Sentence type

n

Bizarre
immediate

Bizarre
delay

Control
immediate

Control
delay

Bizarre
Old
New
Transformed
Inference
Noncase

2
8
8
8
8
8

.63
.73
.57
.29
.21
.00

.17
.80
.77
.61
.35
.11

.00
.74
.72
.14
.16
.01

.00
.85
.84
.62
.54
.16

=

the number of each type on the recognition list.
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Table 3
Mean A' for Each Type of Distractor Sentence in Each Condition
Condition

Distractor type
New
Transformed
Inference
Noncase

Bizarre
immediate

Bizarre
delay

Control
immediate

Control
delay

.64

.52
.68
.81
.91

.53
.89
.87
.93

.50
.73
. 71
.91

.80
.83
.93

Note. A' was computed from the hit rate for the eight old sentences, compared to the false-alarm rate for
the eight sentences from each distractor type. A score of .5 represents the inability to differentiate between
old sentences and distractors.

were the relatively low rejection levels for
transformed and inference distractors by
control-delay subjects. These results may
indicate that both types of sentences were
easily inferred from the acquisition material.
In general, as memory for detail presum
ably declined over time, all subjects' re
sponses increasingly reflected logical in
ferences. The inferences may have been
stored at acquisition and easily rejected when
testing was immediate, due to still excellent
memory for detail. Or, the inferences may
have occurred at delayed testing, due to the
nonavailability of specific input information.
However, it is clear that subjects in the
bizarre-acquisition condition differentiated
possible inferences based on their exposure
to bizarre sentences. They retained some in
formation as long as 2 wk following ac
quisition, which allowed them to respond
positively to transformed sentences and to
mostly reject bizarre sentences. This pattern
of responding may indicate transformational
encoding.
New and noncase sentences. All subjects
were uniformly superior at rejecting non
case sentences, as in other experiments using
this paradigm (Bransford & Franks, 1972) .
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that for most
conditions, the difference in proportion of
yes responses between old and new sensible
sentences was unreliable, replicating Brans
ford and Franks's findings, except for the
bizarre-immediate condition. The difference
in proportion of yes responses was reliably
greater for this condition than for the con
trol-immediate condition, F ( 1, 44) = 4.36,

1.62, p < .041. But since the A' data
(Table 3) did not reflect a reliable difference
between bizarre-immediate and control-im
mediate conditions in the rejection of new
sentences, the interpretation is difficult. A
plausible interpretation is that the occurrence
of bizarre sentences inculcated a more con
servative bias in responding to recognition
sentences.
Additional support for an effect of bizarre
information on context accuracy was pro
vided by examining sentences written during
the acquisition task for potential differences
between acquisition conditions. Sentences
copied following the occurrence of the first
bizarre sentence (Position 5) were scored
for the number of errors in surface struc
ture that they contained (omissions or ad
ditions ·of simple ideas, phrase-order rever
sals, and other order confusions) . Errors
were twice as frequent in the control condition
as in the bizarre condition (totals of 21 and
10, respectively) . A chi-square analysis was
performed by categorizing the performance
of each subject according to acquisition con
dition and the presence or absence of sur
face-structure error (x2 corrected for con
tinuity = 5.34, p < .025) . In both conditions,
very few errors occurred prior to the first
bizarre sentence, and bizarre sentences were
copied accurately.
MS.=

Experiment 2
The results from the first experiment dem
onstrated that omissions and transformations
of bizarre information were characteristic
of recognition performance. However, bi-
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zarre-delay subjects could often reject trans
formed sentences ; for example, there was a
substantial difference between the delayed
rejection of these sentences and new sen
tences. Furthermore, control-delay subjects
tended to falsely recognize both types of
inferences. These results indicated that pro
viding recognition distractors may have con
strained memory performance. Therefore, a
cued-recall task was employed in Experi
ment 2 to allow for the expression of unique
transformations and to compare levels of in
ference production across conditions.
Method
Subjects.
Thirty-one students participated in
the experiment. The acquisition materials were
presented to groups of 7-9 subjects, and the size of
the test groups ranged from 3 to 6. Groups were
randomly assigned to acquisition conditions, and
subjects within groups were randomly assigned to
testing conditions.
Materials. The acquisition lists were identical
to those in Experiment 1. All response sheets for
cued recall followed the format of three key words
from one idea set typed across the top of the page,
with nine numbered spaces below. For the idea set
concerning the woman, cuing words were woman,
hot dogs, and children, and for the second set, they
were grandfather, girl, and bike.
Procedure.
The acquisition phase and reten
tion intervals duplicated Experiment 1. The testing
phase began with the distribution of response
sheets, and the following instructions were pre
sented on tape:
Your task is to recall the nine sentences you have
heard in this experiment which contained one or
more of the words at the top of the page, and
to write these sentences in the spaces provided.
Each sentence you write must contain at least
one of the words you see, and you must write all
nine. If you have great difficulty remembering
a sentence, write a close approximation to what
it might have been.
Instructions mentioned approximations so that sub
jects tested at delay would consider the task more
reasonable. After the 10 min. allowed for first
recall, the second response sheet was distributed,
and the instructions were repeated. Order of idea
set recall was counterbalanced within each testing
group.

Results and Discussion
Scoring. Protocol sentences were exam
ined for possible classification into one of
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four categories. Sentences were judged as
belonging to the idea-set category if they
contained simple ideas or combinations of
simple ideas within the idea set and did not
include elaborations ; word substitutions
were allowed as long as they preserved the
meaning of the ideas. The inference category
was employed for sentences stating a rela
tionship between the subject of the first
clause and the subject of the second clause
of each full idea set, such that the subject of
the first clause acted on the subject of the
second clause (for example, "The woman
made hot dogs for the hungry children.") .
Other intrusions were allowed, and they oc
curred infrequently. The elaboration cate
gory was reserved for all sentences contain
ing information that could not be directly
inferred from either idea set, such as the no
tions that the children were playing, the
grandfather was sitting on the porch, or the
hot dogs were in the oven. This category was
not used for sentences containing the infer
ences discussed previously. Finally, the bi
zarre category was intended for verbatim
reproductions of the bizarre sentences, plus
any sentences judged to be transformations
of bizarre sentences.
Other types of sentences were produced ;
they consisted of noncase sentences as well
as sentences containing secondary inferences,
such as "The hot dogs were ready for the
children." Their number was indirectly de
termined by the procedural constraint of
writing exactly nine sentences. More im
portantly, because the mean number of such
sentences across conditions was slightly
greater than one, an analysis of possible dif
ferences was prevented by the probable floor
effect.
To obtain an estimate of the reliability of
the classification system, a second observer
scored one protocol from each of four sub
jects in each condition. The correlation be
tween the judgments of the two raters was
.97. Therefore, the classifications made by
the first observer were employed for all
analyses.
Semantic accuracy. The mean number of
sentences produced in the idea-set, inference,
and elaboration categories were analyzed for

PAULA T. HERTEL AND HENRY C. ELLIS
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Table 4

Mean Number of Sentences Produced in Each Condition, According to Sentence Category
Condition

Sentence category

Bizarre
immediate

Bizarre
delay

Control
immediate

Control
delay

Idea set
Inference
Elaboration
Bizarre

11.43
1.71
.43
1.00

9.00
5.14
1.14
.00

13.00
1.63
.63
.00

4.89
6.11
3.44
.00

differences among the four conditions, using for each set of cuing words. Out of the 180
the approach to nonorthogonal analysis of sentences, only 7 inference-type sentences
variance recommended by Appelbaum and were produced. An informal comparison of
Cramer (1974) . Since none of the following the recall data to these production data indi
analyses reliably interacted with the idea-set cates that inferences were reliably produced
variable, the data were collapsed across idea at delay.
sets or protocols. Table 4 contains the mean
Although the production of inference sen
number of idea-set, inference, and elabora tences did not reliably differ between acqui
tion sentences (as well as the mean number sition conditions at delayed testing, control
of bizarre sentences) that were produced in delay subjects wrote significantly more
each condition.
elaboration sentences than did bizarre-delay
The major findings were that subjects in subjects, F ( l , 27) = 6.01, MSe = 5.88,
both acquisition conditions wrote primarily p < .021. The tendency of bizarre-delay sub
idea-set sentences at immediate recall, jects to write more idea-set sentences and
whereas at delayed testing, the recall of con fewer elaboration sentences than control
trol subjects not exposed to bizarre material delay subjects probably indicates better mem
was largely comprised of inference and elabo ory for the nature of the acquisition list and/
ration sentences. The difference between ac or a greater bias to write sentences that
quisition conditions in immediate production conform to it. In either case, hearing un
of idea-set sentences was not reliable, usual sentences had a long-lasting effect on
F (1, 27) = 2.22, MSe = 9.28, indicating that recall of sensible material.
all subjects relied on information in the idea
Transformations of the bizarre. Four of
sets. Second, at delayed testing, the produc ·the seven subjects in the bizarre-immediate
tion of idea-set sentences declined for both condition wrote a total of seven sentences
acquisition conditions, but the decline was placed in the bizarre category. One subject
greater for the control condition, as indicated attempted to preserve the bizarre quality of
by a reliable interaction, F(l, 27) = 6.67, the acquisition sentence : "The bike was pro
MSe = 9.28, p < .016.
tective to the grandfather." The remaining
The mean number of inference sentences six sentences were clear interpretations. Two
produced by both acquisition conditions of these contained the idea that the woman
clearly increased across testing conditions, prepared hot dogs and occurred on proto
F ( l , 27) = 11.69, MSe = 10.63, p < .002. cols containing no other inferences. This
To be certain that these inferences were type of inference was not written by subjects
based on memory for the presented material in other conditions. Therefore, these sen
and were not artifactual of the frequency tences may indicate transformational encod
with which the cuing words might be com ing. Furthermore, the other interpretations
bined arbitrarily into sentences with similar produced immediately (e.g., "The grand
meaning, an additional group of 10 subjects father was happy that the bike was not
was asked to construct 9 probable sentences hurt") were intuitively good examples of ef-

MEMORY FOR THE BIZARRE

fort after meaning. It is certainly possible
that they were produced due to a bias to
write sensible sentences, but since the design
of the experiment logically reduced such a
production bias, these sentences may at least
partially indicate encoding efforts.
Virtually no evidence for transformations
was produced at delayed testing, even though
many inferences were written. By comparing
these results to those of Experiment 1, it
may be concluded that transformations were
not sufficiently incorporated with informa
tion from the idea sets to be readily acces
sible at delayed testing. This line of reason
ing also suggests that inference production
occurred at testing ; an inability to retrieve
transformations of the bizarre implies a simi
lar inability to retrieve previously stored
inferences.
General Discussion
The more important results from Experi
ments I and 2 are relevant to Bartlett's
(1932) assumption that unusual elements
within a sensible context are omitted or
transformed in an effort after meaning. These
results demonstrate that the availability of
bizarre information decreased dramatically
over a 2-wk. period, and bizarre sentences
were never recalled verbatim. Instead, they
appear to have been transformed to fit the
context of the sensible material. Transfor
mations were produced in an immediate
recall test, under conditions which should
have minimized a sensible response bias.
Furthermore, only the subjects who received
bizzare input were reliably poorer at reject
ing transformational distractors than general
inference distractors at delayed recognition.
The last finding indicates some transfor
mational representation of bizarre informa
tion, in spite of the findings that control
delay subjects tended to falsely recognize
both types of inferential distractors and all
subjects produced an increased number of
inferences at delayed recall. Since bizarre
delay subjects did not produce transforma
tions at delayed recall, these inferences most
likely resulted from processes operating
during the memory test. At delayed testing,
subjects presumably have less specific infor-
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mation available (Dooling et al., Note 1)
and may, therefore, make inferences based
on the general theme of the sensible material.
The fact that bizarre-acquisition subjects
did not use information contained in bizarre
sentences to express these inferences at
delayed recall certainly suggests that the
transformational effect was relatively weak
and that subjects did not incorporate trans
formations into their integrated representa
tions for the sensible context. The nature
of the acquisition task is possibly responsible
for this weak effect. Bartlett (1932) found
that unusual information was explained in
a manner that facilitated comprehension of
the entire passage, whereas the ideas em
ployed in these experiments could be easily
understood and inferences readily made. In
short, materials of these experiments re
quired fewer integrative efforts and less
need to incorporate :transformational at
tempts, compared to the processing of
strange folktales.
Second, the results of both experiments
suggest that the processing of syntactically
strange information can improve memorial
accuracy with regard to the sensible con
text. Although sensitivity to new distractors
at immediate testing was not reliably
superior for subjects who had heard bizarre
sentences, these subjects made fewer posi
tive responses to these distractors, compared
to old sentences, than did control subjects.
This pattern of results may very well indi
cate that bizarre information led to a more
conservative response bias. Alternatively,
the superior copying performance of bizarre
acquisition subjects suggests that bizarre
information affected encoding accuracy. The
latter possibility, although unsupported by
the A' data, is consistent with the view that
the amount of cognitive effort employed to
process at a particular level can account for
differences in memory performance (Hertel,
Tyler, McCallum, & Ellis, Note 2). Either
the raised response criterion explanation or
the encoding effort explanation can be in
voked to account for the superior recall
accuracy of bizarre-delay subjects. After
2 wk., their performance demonstrated better
memory for the nature of the acquisition list
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and fewer importations of nonimplicated
details. It therefore appears that hearing
syntactically unusual sentences leads to more
cautious encoding and/or retrieval of the
sensible context.
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